Law Society of Singapore v Tan Jeh Yaw

Tan Jeh Yaw was admitted as an advocate and solicitor on 9 February 2011, after about 16 months as a Deputy Public Prosecutor, and was the sole proprietor of Tan Jeh Yaw Law Chambers. From January 2019 to July 2019 he acted as supervising solicitor for two practice trainees, Mr K and Mr L. It was not disputed that he was not qualified to do so under r 18(1)(b) of the Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2011, because in the seven years before supervision began he had held a practising certificate for only three years, one month and some days, well short of the required five. He had signed three letters to the Singapore Institute of Legal Education confirming he met the r 18(1) requirements, and later signed both trainees' certificates of diligence.

He objected to Mr K's admission, a matter in which Mr K was investigated and warned over submitting an amended training checklist, and Mr K retrained elsewhere before admission on 5 April 2021. The shortfall came to light around April 2021. Mr L, already admitted, had to obtain an exemption from the Minister for Law in 2022 to regularise his position. After the Attorney-General referred the matter, Mr Tan offered to plead guilty and voluntarily stopped renewing his practising certificate. He pleaded guilty before a disciplinary tribunal to two charges, and the tribunal found cause of sufficient gravity. The Law Society then brought Originating Application No 13 of 2024 before the Court of 3 Supreme Court Judges, seeking a suspension of 18 months, the sanction imposed in Law Society of Singapore v Lun Yaodong Clarence [2023] 4 SLR 638.

1. Whether due cause had been shown under s 83(2)(j) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 in respect of both charges.
2. Whether striking off, suspension or a fine was the appropriate sanction.
3. What length of suspension was appropriate, given the harm caused, culpability, remorse and antecedents.

On due cause, which was not contested, the court followed the Clarence Lun decision: a breach of r 18(1)(b) is a contravention of the Act, and the rule protects the quality of trainee supervision and so the public. Dishonesty is not a precondition for disciplinary action.

On the type of sanction, striking off was not warranted, as the misconduct showed no character defect or fundamental lack of respect for the law. A fine was not enough, since the shortfall was large and not a one-off technical lapse, and the circumstances showed a cavalier attitude to compliance.

On length, the court gave less weight than the Law Society urged to the fact that both trainees completed their full training, since that resulted from when the breach was discovered rather than any wilful act, and Mr L's harm was reduced by the exemption. The respondent's explanation of a rough calculation, possibly counting his prosecution service, was rejected, because that service fell outside the look-back period and the letters he signed should have alerted him. Even so, his culpability was not greater than Mr Lun's, who had kept giving work to a trainee after learning of the problem. The decisive factor was remorse: an early guilty plea and a voluntary suspension of more than 31 months. His two earlier disciplinary matters were dissimilar and minor. He could not receive full credit for the voluntary suspension, as an offender does not set his own punishment.

The court found due cause shown and ordered that the respondent be suspended from practice for 12 months under s 83(1)(b) of the Legal Profession Act 1966, starting on 11 November 2025, the date of the hearing, and ordered him to pay costs of $5,000 (inclusive of disbursements) to the Law Society.