Re The Attorney-General

The Attorney-General applied in HC/SUM 670/2022 (in HC/OS 21/2022) and HC/SUM 669/2022 (in HC/OS 22/2022) for committal orders against Ravi s/o Madasamy, an advocate and solicitor, over his conduct in two cases in November 2021. In a State Courts criminal trial, Public Prosecutor v Magendran Muniandy, he told District Judge Chay Yuen Fatt on 8 November 2021 that he was free for the trial on 9 to 11 November, but on 9 November appeared first in another trial before the Principal District Judge. When he later appeared, he called the District Judge biased, interrupted him while he was speaking to the accused, and said he could be removed at will by the State; the next day he said the judge was in contempt of court and lacked security of tenure, then left.

In a High Court suit, Chua Qwong Meng v SBS Transit Ltd, on 22 November 2021 he accused Justice Audrey Lim of bias and of favouring opposing counsel, applied for her to disqualify herself, interrupted her repeatedly, called her directions an "illegal law", and said he and his client would discharge themselves. His client then wrote to the court discharging him and asking for an adjournment to find new counsel. Early on 24 November 2021, a paralegal acting on Mr Ravi's instructions emailed the Registry that "we" wished to proceed with the trial that day. Ten allegations of contempt were brought under the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016. His main defence was a relapse of bipolar disorder, supported by two psychiatric reports. This judgment dealt with liability only.

1. Whether he gave false information about his availability for trial with intent to obstruct justice.
2. Whether his accusations of bias and other remarks scandalised the court or were fair criticism.
3. Whether his interruptions and remarks were insults or interruptions under s 3(1)(d).
4. Whether acting without his client's instructions was contempt, and whether bipolar disorder negated intention.

On availability, there was a reasonable doubt whether he had been engaged for the other trial when he spoke to the District Judge, since his correspondence said he was not acting in it and instructions may have come in the gap between hearings. Neither falsity nor intent was proved, though the double-fixing reflected poor management of his schedule.

On bias, the accusations against both judges had no rational basis, arose from routine rulings, and impugned the courts' impartiality in open court, posing a risk to public confidence. They were not made in good faith or temperately, so were not fair criticism. His remarks that Justice Lim's directions were unlawful and an "illegal law" also impugned the propriety of the court.

On s 3(1)(d), he repeatedly cut across both judges, including by speaking in another language to stop the District Judge from addressing the accused. Remarks that the District Judge could be removed by the State and lacked tenure were scornful insults made in retaliation for adverse rulings. The court held that fair criticism, provided only for scandalising contempt, does not apply under s 3(1)(d), and in any event the remarks were irrelevant and offensive. As a senior practitioner he ought to have known the risk to the proceedings.

On instructions, a lawyer who acts without or against instructions risks misleading the court. Repeating the disqualification application and threatening an appeal, then quickly dropping it after speaking to the client, showed he had no instructions. Doubt remained on the client-discharge application, as the client seemed confused and filed no affidavit. The email of 24 November falsely suggested the client wanted to proceed with him at once, and he had told the paralegal not to copy the client. His privilege objection failed because he had already been discharged.

The psychiatric evidence described only a contributory link and found him not of unsound mind. Nothing showed he acted involuntarily or could not form intent; its weight was left to sentencing.

The High Court allowed the applications in part on liability, finding him guilty of contempt on the second to eighth and tenth allegations and on part of the ninth (the disqualification application), but not on the first allegation or the client-discharge aspect of the ninth; submissions on punishment were invited.